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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the purpose for which the statute was enacted, it seems that the legis-
lative intent was clearly to prohibit this type of transaction.7
A dissenting opinion in the principal case would allow recovery
on the grounds that the suit is in tort for conversion and the plaintiff
technically could establish his title to the property without the aid of
an illegal transaction. In cases where recoveries in conversion were
granted, titles were proved through a conditional sale agreement,8 an
implied bailment,g or in replevin where a subsequent wrongful taking
was independent of an illegal transaction." Recovery is generally
denied where the plaintiff must claim title through a bailment for an
illegal purpose" or a contract of sale declared void by express
statute.'
2
In the principal case the money was invested for the purpose of
fraudulently obtaining a license to manufacture beer which is analog-
ous to bailment for an illegal purpose. Furthermore title can be
claimed only through the dummy agent in whose name the securities
are registered. Thus, plaintiff can prove only beneficial title and even
that must be proved through the illegal transaction.
As courts will not aid immoral or illegal acts,3 courts have en-
forced or refused to enforce contracts in particular cases by employ-
ing subtle distinctions as to whether illegality was collateral, 4 or
remote, or whether a new consideration had arisen.15 Since legislative
policy expressed in statutes should determine decisions in contract
law, 6 the majority correctly gave weight to the statute in the principal
case, notwithstanding the fact that the suit was in conversion.
A.M.H.
CORPORATIONS
ULTRA VIRES ACTS IN INDIANA
The Indiana General Corporation Act provides: "Each corpora-
tion shall have the capacity possessed by natural persons, but shall
have authority to perform only such acts as are necessary, convenient
of the sale and manufacture of alcoholic beverages. Handler v.
Peter Doelger Brewing Corp., 173 Misc. 173, 17 N. Y. S. (2d)
275 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
7 Romano v. Bono, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 204 (1938); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS (1932) § 580.
sPelosi v. Bugbee, 271 Mass, 579, 105 N. E. 222 (1914).
9Matsa v. Katsoulas, 192 Wis. 212, 212 N. W. 261 (1927).
10 Martin v. Hodge, 47 Ark. 378, 1 S. W. 694 (1886).
"lDuffy v. Gorman 64 Mass. 45, (1852); Funk v. Gallivan, 49 Conn.
124, (1881); ci. Dwight v. Brewster, 18 Mass. 50 (1822).
2 Myers v. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 366 (1869); Parker v. Latner, 60 Me.
528 (1872); Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 N. H. 67 (1852); cf.
Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark. 518 (1876); Hall v. Corcoran, 107
Mass. 251 (1871).
1"Homan v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K. B. 1775).
14 Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen, 276 N. Y. 234, 11 N. E. (2d) 908
(1937).
ISArmstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258 (U. S. 1826).
"11Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 679.
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or expedient to accomplish the purposes for which it is formed and
such as are not repugnant to law."' This section has given rise to two
important questions. Has the statute destroyed the doctrine of ultra.
vires in Indiana? If not, has the statute changed the doctrine of
ultra vires, in Indiana, and if so, to what extent?
The term "ultra vires" has been loosely used by the courts and
authors.2 By one definition, an ultra vires act is one legal in its
inception, but beyond the authority of the parties to perform; 3 by
another it is one which the corporation has no power under its charter
to perform.4 No definition of an ultra vires act is included in the
Indiana statute, but a section imposing penalties for ultra vires acts
seems to apply to acts done in excess of the powers granted.5 Appar-
ently the legislature intended to accept the power definition of ultra
vires. Since the act gives corporations the capacity of natural persons,
it appears that corporate acts are ultra vires only when they are
Ind. Acts 1929, c. 215, § 3, IND STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 25-202.
"This provision is adapted from section 11-I of the Uniform Act
[9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (Perm. ed. 1932) 56] and, as there
stated, is designed to solve the troublesome problem of ultra
vires as applied to capacity." IND. GEN. CORP. ACT ANN., p. 6, n. 20.
Similar provisions are found in the laws of several other states.
PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 15, § 2852-301; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN.
(Page, 1939) § 8623-8; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 29-114; LA.
GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1939) § 1092; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1938 Supp.)§ 7492-11. To the same effect, PUB. LAWS OF VT. (1933) §§ 5813,
5817.
The fundamental conflict in authority on the question of ultra
vires may be represented by the statement in Central Transp. Co.
v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 59 (1891) that, "The
objection to the contract is, not merely that the corporation ought
not to have made it, but that it could not make it. The contract
can not be ratified by either party, because it could not have been
authorized by either. No performance on either side can give the
unlawful contract validity, or be the foundation on any action
upon it," as opposed to the statement in Bissell v. Mich. South-
ern Ry. Co., 22 N. Y. 258, 264 (1860), that, "To say that a cor-
poration has no right to do unauthorized acts, is only to put forth
a very plain truism; but to say that such bodies have no power
or capacity to err, is to impute to them an excellence which
does not belong to any created existences with which we are
acquainted."
2 7 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 3399.
3 This definition is used in Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs Co., 113
Cal. App. 479, 298 Pac. 508, 509 (1931).
4 Savannah Ice Co. v. Canal-La. Bank & Trust Co., 12 Ga. App. 818,
825, 79 S.E. 45, 49 (1913). See also Tourtelot v. Whithed, 9
N. D. 467,-479, 84 N. W. 8, 12. (1900).
5 Section 54 of the statute provides: "Penalty for ultra vires acts.-
If any corporation heretofore or hereafter organized under the
laws of this state shall, under color of any of the powers granted
herein, commit any act in excess of such powers, such act shall
be avoidable at the instance of the prosecuting attorney of the
county in which the principal office of the corporation is located
in a direct proceeding instituted by him against the corporation(Italics supplied.) Ind. Acts 1929, c. 215, § 54, IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 25-253.
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beyond the legal capacity or powers of a natural person. But
since the doctrine of ultra vires does not apply to acts illegal or
against public policy no ultra vires act could be committed and
the doctrine would be abolished.
If this were the result intended, why was an express penalty
provision for ultra vires acts included in the statute?8  That provision
indicates that the legislature did not intend to completely abolish the
doctrine in Indiana. The drafters of the Indiana Act have said:
".. . only those acts are ultra vires that are beyond the authority
of the corporation."'  Hence they apparently intended to accept the
definition that an ultra vires act is one, not beyond the power of the
corporation to perform, but one merely beyond its authority. The
drafters of the Uniform Business Corporation Act, from which section
three of the Indiana Act was patterned,o also adopted this definition.1
Although nothing short of a decision by the court will definitely settle
the point,i2 it seems that, the ultra vires doctrine obtains in Indiana
and that under the Indiana statute, ultra vires acts are those which
are not expressly or inpliedly authorized.
Section three of the statute provides: "Each ... corporation ...
shall have authority to perform only such acts as are necessary, conven-
ient, or expedient to accomplish the purposes for which it is formed
* . ." In using the word "authority" did the legislature mean: each
corporation shall have the privilege (permission) to do only necessary
acts?13 Or was "authority" used in its agency concept? If the latter,
is the State the source of authority or are the stockholders the source?
If the word "authority" were intended to mean "privilege" an
0 Under Hohfeldian nomenclature, the concept "power" is used to
denote a situation where one person (or corporation) has a legal
control, through the volitional exercise of which, he can change
the legal relations e g betwecn himself aid another, or be-
statute would read: "Each corporation shall have the power pos-
sessed by natural persons, but shall have the privege to performonly such acts . . . "Harno, Prvileges and Powers of a C7or-
oratin (1925) 35 Yale L. 3. 13, 16.
7 FrnlnNat. Bank v. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 560, 579, 49 N. E.
592, 598 (1898); Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Southern Ind. Ry.Co., 38 Id. App. 234, 241, 70 N.E. 843, 846 (1904).
m note 5 supra.
0 ND. GEN. CORP. ACT. ANN., p. 6, n. 20.
10 See note 1 sup ira.
e 9 UNiFORM LAWS ANN. (Perm. ed. 1932) 61.
12"n danger in a statutory scheme, which depends to a large
extent for its effect upon the exact meaning of the words 'ca-
pacity' and 'authority,' is that the legislature may not be careful
to maintain the new phraseology. In the Indiana act, for example,
'capacity and authority' are distinguished in one subsection;
powers is used in the next two subsections; and a later section
provdes a penalty for 'ultra vires' acts Such iconsistency may
be fatal to the statute's effecting the desired change in the law."
Note 44 Harv. L. Rev. 280, 282 (1930).
10 This view is advocated i Harno, pr note 6, at 13.
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ultra vires act would be any act not privileged, and thus the statutory
change was one of terminology only. The capacity of a corporation to
do an ultra vires act has long been recognized in Indiana.14 Giving a
corporation the capacity of a natural person, would do nothing more
than make.an already definite proposition of law more definite.
If the agency concept of "authority" is intended and the state is
the so-called principal, 15 then also the statute has made no change.
Under such interpretation, the ordinary rules of ultra vires would
apply to acts done in excess of authority given by the state just as
they have previously been applied to acts done in excess of power
granted by the state.'6 The drafters of the Uniform Business Cor-
poration Act, from which section three of the Indiana Act was pat-
terned,' 7 intended that the agency concept of "authority" apply to
the stockholders as principals and the corporate directors and officers
as agents.' 8 If this interpretation is accepted, the doctrine of ultra
vires can be applied only by the state and'9 the principles of agency
govern what heretofore has been within the doctrine of ultra vires.
34"Corporations, like natural persons, have power and capacity to
do wrong. They may, in their contracts and dealings, break
over the restraints imposed upon them by their charters; and
when they do so, their exemption from liability can not be
claimed on the mere ground that they have no attributes or
faculties which render it possible for them thus to act." Wright
v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, 332, 21 N.E. 907, 910 (1889). Further-
more, a corporation has been held liable for torts done in ultra
vires transactions. Dorsey Machine Co. v. McCaffrey, 139 Ind.
545, 551, 38 N.E., 208, 210 (1894). It could hold good title
to real estate acquired by ultra vires acts. Baker v. Neff,
73 Ind. 68, 70 (1880); Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind. 212, 215(1872); Pilliod v. Angola Ry. and Power Co., 46 Ind. App. 719,
729, 91 N.E. 829, 833 (1910). Fully executed ultra vires con-
tracts were good foundation for rights acquired thereunder. Iter-
man v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 317, 15 N. E. (2d) 365, 370 (1938);
Marion Trust Co. v. Crescent Loan and Inv. Co., 27 Ind. App. 451,
456, 61 N. E. 688, 690 (1901). Recovery might be had on partly
executed ultra vires contracts. Wright v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324,
331, 21 N. E. 907, 910 (1889); Seamless Pressed Steel and Mfg.
Co. v. Monroe, 57 Ind. App. 136, 143, 106 N. E. 538, 541 (1914).
'5 This view has been taken as respects the Louisiana Act which is
almost identical to the Indiana Act. Bennett, The Louisiana Busi-
ness Corporation Act of 1928 (1940) 2 La. L. Rev. 597, 607.
10 "For if the state is the principal and the corporation the agent
in the new agency relationship, lack of authority would seem
no less effective than lack of capacity to render unauthorized
transactions void." Note 44 Harv. L. Rev. 280, 283 (1930).
17 See note 1, supra.
18 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (Perm. ed. 1932) 61. This idea is clearly
expressed in two states by statutes which provide that the articles
of incorporation shall have the effect as between the corporation
and its directors as an authorization of the directors. CIVIL CODE
OF CAL. (Deering, 1937) § 345; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1939)
§ 8623-8.
19 This position was judicially advocated in Harris v. Independence
Gas Co., 76 Kan. 750, 763, 92 Pac. 1123, 1127 (1907). The
penalty provision in the Indiana Act, IND STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933)§ 25-253, provides that the State may bring a quo warranto pro-
NOTES AND COMMENTS
While the principles of agency apply equally to corporate and
natural principals, the facts upon which ratification are predicated
differ. In large corporations a substantial proportion of the share-
holders may not be interested in, and may even be apathetic toward,
the management of corporate affairs. Hence ratification may be
based upon silent acquiescence; or proof of an intention not to ratify
might be excluded because of laches. If stockholders are inattentive
to corporate affairs, the scope of the authority delegated by them may
be held to be extended by reason of such negligence.20 Though a
contract might be beyond the scope of the authority of corporate
agents, a third party would be bound either because it was authorized
by the body of shareholders or ratified by them-if not by any previous
act, then by the act of beginning suit.21 A third party dealing with
a corporate agent, who is acting within the apparent scope of his
authority, would be able to recover against the corporation even though
the particular contract was beyond the agent's actual authority;22 but
a third party who negligently failed to ascertain that the agent is
acting beyond the scope of his authority would not be able to recover
against a non-assenting corporate principal. If a corporate body has
authorized or ratified such a contract, neither it nor the third party
could attack the authority or capacity to make the contract.23
Under this interpretation the rights of a non-assenting shareholder
appear to be in question. Formerly, in Indiana, a non-assenting share-
holder, unless estopped or barred by his laches, could enjoin an act
threatened to be done on behalf of the corporation if such act was
ceeding to avoid an ultra vires act. Unlike the Indiana Act, the
statutes of several other states expressly provide who may and
who may not introduce the doctrine of ultra vires in court action.
See ILL. STAT. ANN. (Jones, 1934) c. 32, § 8; CIVIL CODE OF CAL.
(Deering, 1937) § 345; COMPILED LAWS OF MICH. (1934) § 9953;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1938 Supp.) § 7492-11; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN.
(Page, 1939) § 8623-8; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 15, § 2852-303.
2oDenver Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 9 Colo. 11, 9 Pac. 771 (1886).
21 Olson v. Warroad Mercantile Co., 136 Minn. 310, 161, N. W. 713
(1917).
22Although the doctrine of constructive notice of the contents of a
corporate charter has not been used often by Indiana courts,
it has met with favor in a few cases and has never been re-
pudiated. Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 560, 578,
49 N. E. 592, 598 (1898); Muncie Nat. Gas Co. v. Muncie, 160
Ind. 97, 100, 66 N. E. 436, 438 (1903); Voris v. Star City Bldg.
and Loan Assn., 20 Ind. App. 630, 644, 50 N. E. 779, 783 (1898).
The Indiana statute is the only statute in the United States
which expressly gives a corporation the capacity of a natural
person but fails to destroy the doctrines of constructive notice.
See statutes cited supra note 1. If Indiana courts revive the
doctrine, the possible use of agency principles under the new Act
will be destroyed. See notes (1925) 10 Corn. L. Q. 498, (1925)
9 Minn. L. Rev. 478, (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 540.
23 For express statutory provisions to this effect in other states, see
citations supra note 19.
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beyond the scope of corporate authority.2 - The Indiana statute makes
no express provision for such an action,25 but the court probably will
continue to follow its former decisions.26 If such injunctions were not
allowed, the only remedy of the non-assenting shareholder would be in
a quo-warranto proceeding to forefeit the charter of the corporation,
or enjoin the exercise of unauthorized powers. 27
The preface of the Indiana General Corporation Act Annotated
states that: "The new Acts are thought to contain the best features
of recent legislation concerning corporations throughout the country,
and should clarify the law governing corporations in Indiana . . ."
This appears to be an overstatement so far as ultra vires is concerned.
P.C.M.
EVIDENCE
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
The New York City council appointed a committee to investigate
charges of negligence and maladministration at the city-controlled
Lincoln Hospital. At the committee hearing, the hospital medical
superintendent withheld confidential case record information on the
grounds that the New York Civil Practices act prohibited a physician
from disclosing any information acquired in attending a patient. Held,
the statutory privilege included examination before legislative com-
mittees. New York City Council v. Goldwater, 31 N. E. (2d) 31.
(N. Y. 1940).
At common law, patient-physician communications were not privil-
eged from disclosure in judicial proceedings. However, statutes have
changed the rule in the majority of the states. 8 WiGMOoE, EVIDENCE
(3d ed. 1939) § 2380. In the principal case the court by a liberal
interpretation applied the privilege to non-judicial proceedings. It
felt the decision was necessary to carry out the policy of the statute.
Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Knights of Templar &
Masonic Mutual Aid Ass'n, 126 N. Y. 450, 454, 27 N. E. 942, 943
(1891). Section 354 of the Civil Practices Act indicates that the
privilege applies to any examination of a physician as a witness. This
was strengthened by dicta in a previous New York case to the effect
that witnesses before the commissioner of accounts were entitled to all
the privileges and protection extended by law to witnesses in judicial
proceedings. Matter of Herschfield v. Hanley, 228 N. Y. 346, 127 N. E.
252 (1920).
A dissent advocated restricting the statute to its "primary purpose."
Buffalo Loan, Trust and Safe-Deposit Co. v. Knights Templar and
2 4 Board of Coifnty Comm'rs. v. Lafayette, M. and B. Ry. Co., 50 Ind.
85 (1875); Mercantile Comm. Bank v. So. Eastern Ind. Coal Corp.,
93 Ind. App. 313, 169 N. E. 91, 171 N. E. 310 (1929); Wright
v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, 21 N. E. 907 (1889).
25 Compare statutes cited supra note 19.
2 The drafters of the Uniform Business Corp. Act expect this position
to be taken by the courts. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (Perm. ed.
1932) 58.
27 Columbian Athletic Club v. State, 143 Ind. 98, 40 N. E. 914 (1895).
